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Two TRIPs to Innovation. Pharmaceutical Innovation Systems in India and Brazil
Verena Schüren
Abstract
So far, the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights (TRIPs) and the dynamics of innovation systems have been discussed fairly separa-
tely from each other. Research on TRIPs implementation has tended to focus on the (non-)
adoption of certain TRIPs flexibilities while the literature on National Systems of Innovation 
(NSI) widely neglects the impact of global norms on innovation systems. This paper aims to 
reconcile these two approaches. My analysis of the post-TRIPs pharmaceutical innovation 
systems (PIS) in India and Brazil reveals major differences in the regulatory outcomes that 
go far beyond the mere (non-)adoption of certain flexibilities. Driven by unequal state roles, 
India and Brazil have evolved into having two different types of innovation systems in the 
post-TRIPs era. The paper asks how innovation systems are developing under the conditions 
of globalization and, through this, it contributes to the discussion on innovation systems in 
emerging economies.
Zusammenfassung
Bislang wurden die Implementierung des Übereinkommens über handelsbezogene Aspekte 
der Rechte des geistigen Eigentums (TRIPs) und die Anpassungsprozesse von Innovations-
systemen weitgehend getrennt voneinander diskutiert. Arbeiten zur TRIPs Implementierung 
konzentrieren sich auf die (Nicht-)Anwendung bestimmter Flexibilitäten zum Schutz von öf-
fentlicher Gesundheit, während die Forschung zu nationalen Innovationssystemen den Ein-
fluss von globalen Normen nur schemenhaft in den Blick nimmt. Das Arbeitspapier bringt 
diese beiden Ansätze in Einklang. Eine Analyse der pharmazeutischen Innovationssysteme 
(PIS) in Indien und Brasilien deckt regulative Unterschiede auf, die weit über die Nicht-
(Anwendung) einzelner Flexibilitäten hinausgeht. Es wird argumentiert, dass sich in den bei-
den Ländern – ausgehend von zwei unterschiedlichen Staatsrollen – zwei verschiedenartige 
Typen von Innovationssystemen herausgebildet haben, die sich in ihrer Ausrichtung von-
einander unterscheiden. Das Papier stellt die Frage, wie sich Innovationssysteme unter den 
Bedingungen von Globalisierung entwickeln und leistet damit einen Beitrag zur Diskussion 
über Innovationssysteme in aufstrebenden Ländern.
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1. Introduction1
Emerging countries’ innovation policies are increasingly the subject of government attention as 
well as academic debate. Although most of the BRIC countries have put innovation at the center 
of their development strategies, we still know little about their efforts to establish innovation 
systems (Arroio/Scerri 2010). According to the National Systems of Innovation theory (NSI),2 
innovation and technology development are rooted in a country-specific set of institutions 
whose configurations and interactions determine the performance of an economy (Hollings-
worth 2000; Niosi 2011: 1638). Through their impact on investment, patent systems constitute a 
core feature of NSI (Basant 2006; Mani 2006; Chaturvedi/Chataway 2006). The adoption of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs), hence, put emerging countries’ innovation systems under tremendous pressure 
(Hasenclever/Paranhos 2009: 11). The agreement obliges all WTO member countries to comp-
ly with a set of global patent standards, which, in turn, forces them to abandon their hitherto 
developmental patent regimes. Conflicts between TRIPs exigencies and developmental patent 
regimes have become most prevalent in the pharmaceutical sector, where the trade-off between 
access to and protection of knowledge is most pronounced (Laforgia et al. 2009; Shadlen 2011). 
So far, the implementation of TRIPs and the dynamics of innovation systems have been dis-
cussed fairly separately from each other. The research on TRIPs implementation has tended 
to focus on the (non-)adoption of the TRIPs flexibilities, which provide emerging and deve-
loping countries with a certain leeway in the field of pharmaceuticals for the protection of 
public health (Cullet 2001; Milistien et al. 2007; M. D. Nair 2008; George et al. 2009), and their 
(non-)effective utilization (Drahos 2007; Shadlen 2007; Costa Chaves et al. 2008; Kapczynski 
2009; Gopakumar 2010). However, little attention has been paid to how innovation systems 
in emerging countries have adapted in the post-TRIPs era. People writing on NSI, similarly, 
tend to overlook the importance of developing and emerging countries’ innovation systems in 
general, as well as their underlying global influences (Intarakamnerd 2002; Baskaran/Boden 
2006). 
Drawing on the NSI framework, this paper asks how innovation systems are developing under 
the conditions of globalization. Comparing the post-TRIPs pharmaceutical innovation sys-
1 This paper summarizes findings from a political science research project funded by the German Re-
search Foundation (DFG). Empirical evidence has been obtained by document-based process tracing 
and semi-structured interviews in Europe (Geneva, Brussels), India (Delhi, Mumbai), and Brazil 
(Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, São Paulo) between 2010 and 2012. All interview partners are assured their 
confidentiality as their individual names and other information that might endanger their anony-
mity are not revealed here. I would like to thank Susanne Lütz, Thomas Eimer and Željko Branovic 
(SFB 700) for helpful discussions on the concept of innovation systems. Furthermore, I am indebted 
to Ken Shadlen (LSE London) and Pranav N. Desai (JNU New Delhi) for their most valuable sugge-
stions. I would also like to thank Charlotte Schöne for her editorial support. A first version of this 
paper was presented at the BISA/DVPW Conference in St. Andrews, Scotland, 19-21 December, 2011.
2 Throughout this paper, I will use the term “(pharmaceutical) innovation system” when talking about 
the de facto developments in India and Brazil. With the term “National Systems of Innovation” (NSI), 
in turn, I solely refer to the theoretical and analytical concept as Christopher Freeman and Bengt-
Åke Lundval introduced it in the 1980s. 
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tems (PIS) in India and Brazil, I reveal major differences in the regulatory outcomes that go 
far beyond the mere (non-)adoption of certain flexibilities. While the Indian PIS has become 
strongly oriented to and integrated in the global market, the Brazilian PIS largely centers on 
domestic demand, thus remaining rather unrelated to the global market. I suggest a threefold 
argument to address the different outcomes produced in these two situations: 
• First, the Indian and Brazilian governments assume different state roles in the realm 
of pharmaceutical innovation that impact the demand in the PIS. 
• Second, these different state roles are linked to varying patterns of government inter-
vention that, in turn, impact linkages in the PIS. 
• Third, trajectories are consolidated through the way learning is taking place. 
By placing state roles at the center of its analysis, this paper complements former studies that 
largely hold the private sector responsible for separated different PIS outcomes (Thorsteins-
dóttir et al. 2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next part introduces the NSI approach and 
places it in the context of TRIPs. Part 3 addresses the PIS developments in India and Brazil. 
In part 4, 5, and 6, I analyse the sources of the varying developments by assessing demand, 
linkages, and learning. In part 7, I provide an overview of the empirical results and interpret 
them against the background of the NSI framework. Finally, the conclusion points to some 
topics for future research.
2. Bridging the gap: Implementation of TRIPs from an NSI perspective
The NSI approach emerged in the 1980s as a conceptual framework for analyzing patterns of 
technological change and has achieved a lot of recognition from scholars as well as policy-
makers since then (Freeman 1982; Lundvall 1992; Nelson/Rosenberg 1992; Edquist/Hommen 
2006). Departing from the orthodox perspective on growth, the NSI approach explains diffe-
ring economic outcomes from a microeconomic perspective – placing linkages in the produc-
tion and innovation system at the center of its analyses. In this sense, innovation is described 
as an interactive process between actors and institutions (Malerba 2005: 385; Parto et al. 2006). 
Countries are assumed to follow specific trajectories when adjusting their innovation systems. 
The NSI concept still suffers from definitional fuzziness and conceptual fragmentation (Scer-
ri/Lastres 2010: 7). In fact, authors have identified several factors that determine the output of 
these “‘national’ models” (Amable 2000: 657). These include market orientation, institutional 
settings, and socioeconomic context (Niosi 2011: 1638; Guennif/Ramani 2012: 430). However, in 
the case of economies that are “catching up,” three key determinants prevail: the nature of de-
mand, linkages, and learning (Malerba/Nelson 2011: 1650ff). Here, demand is not being seen as an 
aggregate set of equally oriented end users, but rather as a specific pattern of public and private 
actors that forms innovators and producers’ preferences. It can arrive from end users, firms, 
as well as government entities (Edquist/Hommen 2006: 10; Malerba 2006: 9; Malerba/Nelson 
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2011: 1650). Linkages among actors involved in innovation processes determine the range of in-
teraction between public and private sector entities. The NSI concept rests on the premise that 
the scope and character of these linkages are crucial for technological improvements (Edquist 
2005; Edquist/Hommen 2006; Chaturvedy/Chataway 2006; Nassif 2007). Key innovation actors 
are the government, universities, public production and research facilities, as well as private 
firms (Feinson 2003: 25f; Guennif/Ramani 2012: 430). The term learning, meanwhile, places 
emphasis on knowledge acquisition and human resource development. This includes formal 
training as well as the outcome of interaction between actors. In this regard, the NSI approach 
attaches value to linkages and the education system as it strengthens the future orientation 
of actors and knowledge creation within the innovation system (Amable 2000: 651; Lundvall 
2007: 107; Parto et al. 2006: 13). 
Although market actors have an important role in the innovation system, NSI authors re-
cognize the fact that it is the government that assigns their place. Demand, linkages, and 
learning can differ according to the scope and coherence of government actions. State roles 
and government interventions, thus, can be strong factors that influence innovation systems 
(Edquist 2005: 197ff; Parto et al. 2006: 18; Bakovic 2010: 4; 4f; Niosi 2011: 1639). This is espe-
cially true for developing economies where the adaptation of innovation systems can be most 
exigent (Scerri/Lastres 2010: 9). 
Building on the assumptions of NSI literature, Bruno Amable (2000: 670ff) suggests four ty-
pes of social systems of innovation and production (SSIP) that can be distinguished by their 
differing economic performances, including specific patterns of industrial specialization and 
innovation (table 1, page 8). In the market-based SSIP, economic activities are mainly governed 
through competition. Government interventions are on the decline and serve at most as a 
complement to the private sector. Strong IP protection is the key incentive for innovation, whi-
le collective goods suffer from structural underinvestment. The market-based SSIP is strongly 
linked to the global market economy, where niche products and radical innovation is a key 
factor for industrial and technological advancement. Another category suggested by Amable is 
the social-democratic SSIP, where bargaining between social partners forms the general prin-
ciple of interaction. Government interventions are extensive and do not only complement but 
also replace activities in the private sector. IP protection exists but can become subordinated 
to health concerns in case of doubt. Technological advancement is rooted in gradual evolution 
rather than radical change. The social-democratic SSIP is firmly linked to attempting to solve 
social problems, and here the state takes the most active stance. Lying in between these two 
SSIP categories are the meso-corporatist and the public SSIP. In the meso-corporatist SSIP, govern-
ment regulations are driven by the aim to moderate between interest groups. Government 
intervention is taken to furnish and coordinate rather than to steer the private sector. Tech-
nological adaptation is seen as interim step toward product innovation, while the catching 
up process heavily relies on in-house research. In the public SSIP, finally, conciliation between 
public interests is reached under the control of the state. Large public programs encourage 
the private sector. Production and innovation are mainly linked to the public infrastructure, 
while new product development remains out of reach.
Two TRIPs to Innovation |  8
So
ci
al
-d
em
oc
ra
ti
c
P
ub
li
c 
M
es
o-
co
rp
or
at
is
t
M
ar
ke
t-
ba
se
d 
G
en
er
al
 p
ri
n-
ci
pl
e
B
ar
ga
in
in
g 
be
tw
ee
n
 s
oc
ia
l 
pa
rt
n
er
s
C
on
ci
li
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 p
ub
li
c 
in
te
re
st
s 
un
de
r 
st
at
e 
co
n
tr
ol
 
M
od
er
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 in
te
re
st
 
gr
ou
ps
M
ar
ke
t-
ba
se
d 
co
m
pe
ti
ti
on
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
pr
io
ri
ty
So
lu
ti
on
 o
f s
oc
ia
l p
ro
bl
em
s
R
eg
io
n
al
 (E
ur
op
ea
n
) i
n
te
-
gr
at
io
n
Ec
on
om
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
Ec
on
om
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
n
d 
gl
ob
al
 
in
te
gr
at
io
n
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
in
te
rv
en
ti
on
E
xt
en
si
ve
 a
n
d 
co
h
er
en
t
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t o
f 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
La
rg
e 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
Im
po
rt
an
t e
n
co
ur
ag
em
en
t 
of
 p
ri
va
te
 s
ec
to
r
Pa
rt
ia
l
Fu
rn
is
hi
n
g 
an
d 
co
or
di
n
a-
ti
on
 o
f 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
D
ec
li
n
in
g 
an
d 
fr
ag
m
en
te
d 
C
om
pl
em
en
t t
o 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 
U
n
de
ri
n
ve
st
m
en
t i
n
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
go
od
s
IP
 r
eg
im
e
Su
bo
rd
in
at
ed
 to
 h
ea
lt
h 
in
 
ca
se
 o
f 
do
ub
t
-
-
K
ey
 in
ce
n
ti
ve
 fo
r 
in
n
ov
at
io
n
In
no
va
ti
on
 
G
ra
du
al
 e
vo
lu
ti
on
 to
w
ar
d 
ad
va
n
ce
d 
te
ch
n
ol
og
ie
s 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
di
sc
on
n
ec
te
d 
fr
om
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f 
n
ew
 
pr
od
uc
ts
 
A
da
pt
at
io
n
 in
 c
at
ch
in
g-
up
 
ph
as
e,
 p
ro
du
ct
 in
n
ov
at
io
n
 
af
te
r
Im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
in
-h
ou
se
 r
e-
se
ar
ch
Im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
n
ic
he
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
an
d 
ra
di
ca
l i
n
n
ov
at
io
n
s
 
In
du
st
ri
al
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
Li
n
ke
d 
to
 s
oc
ia
l d
em
an
d
Li
n
ke
d 
to
 p
ub
li
c 
in
fr
as
tr
uc
-
tu
re
Li
n
ke
d 
to
 lo
ca
l s
ki
lls
Li
n
ke
d 
to
 g
lo
ba
l m
ar
ke
t
T
ab
le
 1
 –
 S
oc
ia
l S
ys
te
m
s 
of
 I
nn
ov
at
io
n 
an
d 
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(S
SI
P
)
So
ur
ce
: O
w
n
 c
om
pi
la
ti
on
; b
as
ed
 o
n
 A
m
ab
le
 (2
00
0:
 6
71
ff
).
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 37 • June 2012  |  9
While the aforementioned NSI determinants (demand, linkages, and learning) are useful para-
meters to assess variations in the output of an innovation system in terms of technological de-
velopment and interactions, the SSIP framework goes one step further by referring to different 
system principles and priorities. However, neither the NSI framework nor Amable’s typology 
fully reflect on how SSIP respond to global influences. 
TRIPs, in fact, is a prime example of a global influence. It is the biggest challenge related to in-
novation in emerging countries, especially in the pharmaceutical sector (Hasenclever/Paranhos 
2009: 11). The agreement requires the provision of patent protection for pharmaceutical pro-
cesses and products – which strongly impacts the patent systems of these countries as most of 
them didn’t provide for product patents in this field before (Shadlen 2007: 559f; Li 2008: 1368). 
Patents, in turn, represent an essential part of an NSI (Amable 2000: 650; Edquist 2005: 190f; 
Basant 2006: 1; Parto et al. 2006: 2ff). This is especially true for the pharmaceutical sector where 
“patents are unambiguously recognized as being key instruments for privately appropriating 
the economic benefits of innovation and, therefore, serving as an important incentive for fur-
ther innovation” (Laforgia et al. 2009: 293).
I expect a change in global patent standards to impact PIS in emerging countries for at least 
three more reasons. First, TRIPs changes the perceptions and preferences of local firms. To the 
extent that the copying of technologies that already exist becomes an obsolescent business mo-
del, local firms have to adapt their strategies to ensure sales markets. Here again, government 
interventions can have an important catalyzing effect (Guennif/Ramani 2012: 431). Second, the 
adoption of TRIPs and its subsequent implementation lure global firms, who, for their part, 
are in search for profitable business models, e.g., in the field of contract research and licensing 
(Baskaran/Boden 2006). The entry of foreign market actors, in turn, can result in new linkages 
in the PIS. And finally third, local governments, anticipating these trends, will take measures 
in order to optimize national development priorities against the backdrop of global regulatory 
pressure (Niosi/Bellon 1994: 189ff). Overall, TRIPs urges developing and emerging countries 
to adopt an innovation system in which technological advancement is patent driven. In doing 
so, the treaty exerts a considerable “harmonizing power” on these countries (Kapczynski 2009: 
1571). However, as a closer analysis of post-TRIPs pharmaceutical innovation systems in India 
and Brazil will show, countries can still opt for different trajectories when adapting their PIS. 
In order to assess how PIS in India and Brazil have developed under the conditions of globali-
zation, I refer both to the NSI and the SSIP framework. The following analysis is split into three 
steps. First, I identify differences in the regulatory and innovative capabilities of post-TRIPs PIS 
in India and Brazil. Second, I trace these differences back to the aforementioned NSI determi-
nants. Third, inspired by Amable’s work, I assess the existence of two different types of SSIP. In 
this sense, this paper does not strive for a causal explanation of the differing developments. Rat-
her, it begins from a description and analytical classification of these differing developments.
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3. The development of PIS in India and Brazil
India and Brazil are interesting cases to compare as they share important features in the phar-
maceutical sector. First, both countries have a single, large market and a relatively large amount 
of qualified scientific personnel. Second, governments in both states pursued strong industrial 
development as a priority since the mid 1950s. As a result, PIS in both countries have been de-
signed to foster domestic production, promote import substitution, and reduce prices. Third 
and related to this, both countries share a history of having had a considerable period of lax 
patent protection (excluding product patents in the pharmaceutical sector). Reverse engineer-
ing – the copying of already existing technologies – has been the dominant strategy of “catch-
ing up” in both these countries for decades (George et al. 2009: 117f; Thach/Marsnik 2009: 250; 
Guennif/Ramani 2010: 5f; Peterson 2010: 10). With the establishment of the TRIPs agreement, 
however, India and Brazil had to abandon their developmental strategies (Shadlen 2007). Since 
the beginning of the 2000s, governments in both countries have launched policy initiatives 
that acknowledge innovation as a fundamental tool for development in general (MST 2003; 
Presidente da República 2004) and for the pharmaceutical sector in particular (Governo Federal 
2003; MoCF 2005). 
Despite these common grounds, India and Brazil’s post-TRIPs PIS have evolved in quite dif-
ferent ways. A first noticeable difference lies in the accumulation of innovative capabilities in 
the private sector. After TRIPs was agreed upon in 1995, leading Indian generic firms started 
to invest heavily in research and development (R&D). They established innovative branches to 
complement their generic business model and, by today, widely prove their success in the field 
of incremental innovations. Some firms, however, are also reaching out to acquire new drug 
discovery and development capabilities. High rates of in-house R&D have been the main driver 
for these advancements (Basant 2006: 3; Guennif/Ramani 2012: 437f ). A common indicator to 
measure innovative capabilities in the private sector is the number of foreign patent applica-
tions (Bakovic 2010: 5). Two differences attract attention here. First, the amount of Indian patent 
applications far outstrips Brazilian applications. Second, while in India research activities are 
concentrated in the private sector, Brazilian private sector firms have largely remained focused 
on the imitation of foreign technologies; the more innovative efforts are in Brazil taking place 
in public sector entities (Rezaie et al. 2008: 627ff; Guennif/Ramani 2012: 438).3 It is safe to say that 
hardly any private firm is at present taking serious steps toward drug discovery, let alone deve-
lopment. An exception to this rule is the company Cristália, which has nine patents according 
to the statistics of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO 2012). 
3 In 2010, India filed 1,285 patents under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) of the World Intellectu-
al Property Organization (WIPO). Nine of the top ten applicants are involved in pharmaceutical re-
search (WIPO 2011a). Almost thirty Indian pharmaceutical firms received five or more patents at the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 2007 and 2011. Brazil, in comparison, submitted 
only 488 patent applications to the PCT in 2010. In the top ten applicants, only two are engaged in 
pharmaceutical research. Significantly, these two parties are state universities (WIPO 2011b). A se-
cond important indicator for innovation is the number of scientific publications. In this area, Brazil 
is one of the world leaders. However, it is again the public entities that account for this achievement 
(Ferrer et al. 2004: 8f ).
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A second difference lies in the portfolio of research activities. In India, research focuses on life-
style and chronic diseases, like diabetes and cardiovascular diseases, as well as on niche sectors 
like biogenetics and stem-cell research (Interview 284; 278; 324). Even publicly funded research 
entities have been involved in this trend (Eimer/Lütz 2010: 138; Interview 322). This develop-
ment has caused much controversy, as it centers national research capacities on foreign rather 
than domestic disease patterns (Mani 2006: 20; Abrol 2006: 25ff; Hassan et al. 2010: 30ff). In 
Brazil, in contrast, current research activities to a large extent remain focused on fields relevant 
to the health problems within the country. Immunization and tropical as well as sexually trans-
mitted diseases are at present the predominant areas of scientific research (Thorsteinsdóttir et 
al. 2004a: DC48; Ferrer et al. 2004: 8f; OSEC 2010: 41).
A third difference lies in the degree of internationalization. The Indian PIS is recording rising 
export rates and a high connection with international regulatory authorities, making India’s 
pharmaceutical industry the “single largest pharma player in the world ‘post-TRIPs’” (G. G. 
Nair 2008: 441). Indian pharmaceutical exports have been increasing at an annual compound 
rate of approximately 22% since the mid 1990s and reached a volume of 12 billion US dollars 
by 2011 (Chaudhuri 2008: 278; Neeraj 2011). As imports have remained relatively stable, India 
has achieved a positive trade balance in which exports increasingly outstrip imports (Joshi 
2003; Hasenclever/Paranhos 2009: 4; Neeraj 2011; Guennif/Ramani 2012: 438). The boost in ex-
ports goes hand in hand with a high degree of international regulatory compliance. Firms and 
research institutes increasingly comply with the Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), the 
Good Clinical Practices (GCPs), and the Good Laboratory Practices (GLPs). These three prac-
tices harmonize the quality controls in formulation manufacturing and research (ICMR 2008: 
2; Interview 299). Today, more than 100 Indian firms are already engaged in clinical research. 
While most of them are acting on a low-threshold level, leading enterprises like Dr. Reddys 
and Glenmark are also conducting high-end tests up to phase four (Interview 299). Companies 
are also firmly integrated into international aid programs where they act as major suppliers of 
generic HIV/AIDS drugs for sub-Saharan Africa (Van Dyk 2007: 143). All in all, Indian firms 
have established strong links to foreign actors and nowadays function as “an integral part of 
the strategies of western firms” (Abrol 2006: 43). 
The Brazilian PIS, in comparison, has remained rather centered around the domestic market. 
Stagnating exports and increasing imports of pharmaceuticals in the post-TRIPs period have 
resulted in a trade deficit of nearly 3 billion US dollars (Hasenclever/Paranhos 2009: 4). The 
vast majority of Brazilian producers focus their firms’ strategies on domestic supply and re-
frain from export-oriented activities (Interview 235). Brazilian firms hold only a small share of 
the global pharmaceutical market and, in contrast to their Indian counterpart, remain virtual-
ly unconnected to foreign regulatory authorities and international programs. Brazilian Good 
Practices Standards do not match OECD standards and several airports still do not comply with 
the applicable requirements for export (Hasenclever/Paranhos 2009: 14). To date, practically no 
local producer has applied for a WHO prequalification (OSEC 2010: 41; Interview 226). Instead, 
Brazilian firms serve as supplier to the government’s health programs, which strongly link 
them to the national procurement and production system (Cohen/Lybecker 2005: 214f; Rezaie 
Two TRIPs to Innovation |  12
et al. 2008: 630ff). Table 2 gives a summary of the post-TRIPs PIS characteristics in India and 
Brazil. 
Table 2 – Post-TRIPs PIS characteristics in India and Brazil
Brazil India
Innovative capabilities Concentration in the public sector Concentration in the private sector
Research portfolio Oriented toward the domestic market Oriented toward foreign markets
Internationalization Low High
The following section tries to assess the different PIS developments. Referring to demand, 
linkages, and learning, I will argue that the states, by assuming different roles, have triggered 
two different systems of innovation and production.
4. Demand matters: Benevolent shopaholic vs. withdrawn miser 
According to NSI theory, demand forms an integral part of an innovation system. It deter-
mines the size of the sales market and provides incentives for entrepreneurial thinking and 
action (Edquist/Hommen 2006: 10; Malerba 2006: 9). 
With 1.2 billion inhabitants, India is more than six times bigger than Brazil. However, due to 
a significantly higher per capita expenditure on health, total Brazilian health spending is 16% 
higher than in India. This mismatch becomes even more evident when looking at the spen-
ding on pharmaceuticals. In 2000, the annual average per capita expenditure on pharmaceu-
ticals in India was only 3 US dollars as compared to 61 US dollars in Brazil (WHO 2004). This 
relatively high spending makes Brazil one of the most attractive emerging sales markets for 
local as well as global pharmaceutical producers (TransWorldNews 01/06/2011). 
One major cause for the huge differences in pharmaceutical sales lies in the different state roles 
in the articulation of demand. Brazil is considered an “activist state” in the field of health that 
sees the provision of drugs as an important part of its responsibilities (Biehl 2004: 115). The 
government not only acts as a regulator but also as a supplier and – most notably – as a buyer 
in the PIS, thereby assuming the role of a leading “health entrepreneur” (Cassier/Correa 2007: 
84). It sustains a sizeable procurement system and is responsible for almost half of the total 
national health spending. Furthermore, the government counts as single largest purchaser of 
pharmaceuticals within Brazil and as one of the biggest buyers worldwide (Interview 166; 255). 
In 2009, the total amount for acquisition of medicine for its national health system, the Siste-
ma Único de Saúde (SUS), was approximately 4.9 billion US dollars. And as the government is 
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expanding publicly paid health coverage to new areas like diabetes and hypertension, further 
increases are to be expected (Vieira 2009; Vieira/Zucchi 2011; Giugale 2011; MS 2011). 
In sharp contrast to Brazil, the Indian state is hesitant to actively engage in the PIS. It acts 
foremost as legislative body and regulator and abstains from assuming the role of a buyer for 
health care generally and for pharmaceuticals in particular (Abrol 2006: 41). Public health 
expenditure has been decreasing over years.4 Domestic demand for pharmaceuticals there-
fore mainly derives from private consumption. Yet, due to inefficiencies in the distribution 
systems and the prevalence of traditional healing methods such as ayurveda and homeopa-
thy, “modern” drugs are not widespread among private households, especially in rural areas. 
According to estimations, only 30% of the Indian population has access to these drugs (Inter-
view 279; 283; Kaplan/Laing 2005: 15; TransWorldNews 01/06/2011). As the government does 
not step in as buyer, the domestic purchasing power for pharmaceuticals remains relatively 
low, making an orientation toward foreign markets more profitable for Indian manufactures 
(Interview 156; Interview 283; MoCI 2008: 29). 
Thus, by assuming different roles, India and Brazil’s governments produce different demand 
patterns that spur global integration in the first PIS and domestic orientation in the second 
PIS. The next section will show that these state roles correspond with different types of go-
vernment intervention that, in turn, contribute to the orientation of the PIS. 
5. Made linkages: Cosmopolitan laissez-faire vs. monitored stay at home
Actor linkages and interactions are the second decisive feature for an NSI. Government in-
terventions play an important role in shaping these bonds. They account in a major way for 
which public and private producers become linked to each other and, in doing so, influence 
the market orientation of manufacturers (Chaturvedi/Chataway 2006: 4). After TRIPs, the 
pharmaceutical sector was declared a priority area both in India and Brazil. R&D efforts were 
broadened and governments in both countries took action to foster innovative capabilities in 
this field including financial and fiscal incentives (Hasenclever/Paranhos 2009: 3). The scope 
and depth of public action, however, differ considerably and have resulted in varying patterns 
of government intervention.
The rather passive role of the Indian state corresponds with a strengthening of the private 
sector and an increasingly market-based governing mode within the PIS (Abrol 2006; Inter-
view 275). Three features of government intervention are noticeable in this regard. First, even 
though Indian leaders recognize innovation as the “survival kit” in the post-TRIPs scenario, 
government involvement has been restricted to the coordination of the private sector whi-
le public sector entities have been continuously neglected since the 1990s. Publicly funded 
4 Recently, the Indian government announced plans to expand its public drug procurement from 
around 0.1% to 0.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Concrete measures are, however, outstan-
ding (ToI 2012).
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research on health has been sinking or stagnating (Krishna 2001: 192). Meanwhile, Indian 
public sector undertakings (PSUs) – once the pioneers of pharmaceutical technology deve-
lopment – have fallen behind private competitors after liberalization in the pharmaceutical 
sector (Gopakumar 2010: 351). 
Interestingly, the demise of PSUs is being less attributed to liberalization than it is to political 
mismanagement and lack of political will (Interview 276; 300; 320).5 The two public institutes 
that remain that play a role in pharmaceutical R&D – the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) and the Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR) – are suffering from 
two major shortcomings. First, financial support is insufficient to seriously enter into drug 
development. Research efforts consequently remain widely limited to pre-clinical endeavors 
(Interview 294). Second, neither the ICMR nor the CSIR possess appropriate manufacturing 
facilities. Accordingly, both entities rely on private sector firms in order to commercialize 
their R&D achievements, making them subject to market terms (Interview 280; 313). Final 
products partly end up in exports. It has also been reported that publicly acquired technology 
has gone missing after a foreign takeover of the technology receiver (Interview 320). In light of 
these developments, a former representative of the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Indus-
try (MoCI) concedes: “The public sector has not been encouraged. It has been ignored by the 
government” (Interview 276). 
The government’s reluctant posture is also mirrored in the way that it deals with compulsory 
licenses (CL). Even though all legal and technical requirements for a government issuance 
are met (grounds, capacity, need), it is reluctant to independently initiate a CL although this 
could substantially improve domestic health care (Interview 146; 292). This does not imply that 
Indian authorities want to hinder compulsory licensing in general. However, they state quite 
clearly that this is not going to happen under their lead (Interview 146; 154; 156).6 This even 
includes the Ministry of Health, where an estimated three million people living in India with 
HIV/AIDS counts as “insufficient” to pass for real urgency. The Ministry of Health moreover 
generally refrains from engaging in CL issues. As one ministry official indicates: “For me, pa-
tent is a private right where the government should step out” (Interview 283). 
A second notable feature of government intervention is that the Indian government tools are 
largely restricted to the supply-driven furnishing of the private sector without setting dome-
stic health priorities. Fiscal reliefs and tax-free bonds are the core instruments for innovation 
promotion. The government offers a weighted deduction on in-house R&D as well as subsidies 
for drug discovery and development projects up to 50% (Jeffrey/Santhosh 2009: 23; Interview 
295; 300; 322). What the tools have in common is that they explicitly do not differentiate bet-
5 One interviewee puts it drastically: “The PSUs have politically been allowed to become sick”(Interview 
284).
6 Recently, the issuance of a CL for Bayer’s cancer drug Nexavar in favor of an Indian company caused 
a stir in the public health community. Yet, it is fair to say that the CL stems from the Indian private 
sector without any major ministerial involvement. Quite to contrary, the Indian Ministry of Health 
explicitly refused the Indian applicant any support in this matter (Interview 283).
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ween pathology, purpose, or applicability of the future invention. Instead, assistance is made 
available to every applicant whose project promises to comply with the patentability criteria 
“inventive step” (Interview 276; 294; 313). 
A third notable feature is that Indian authorities promote conformity with international stan-
dards in order to foster export-led growth (Chaturvedi/Chataway 2006: 8). Indian pharma-
ceutical companies receive extra funding if they have internationally approved production 
facilities (Damodaran 2008: 418f ). Besides, in order to expediting marketing and commerci-
alization measures abroad, the government has intensively pushed forward the compliance 
with the above-mentioned standards for pharmaceutical research and manufacturing which 
are in line with the rules of the OECD, the US Food and Drug Administration, and the WHO 
(Interview 299; Mani 2006a: 22; Neeraj 2011: 3).7 India’s proposed National Pharmaceuticals 
Policy explicitly formulates the aim to “enable domestic pharma companies to become inter-
nationally competitive by implementing...established international guidelines” as well as to 
“facilitate higher growth in exports...by reducing the barriers to internationally trade” (MoCF 
2005). 
In sum, government activities in India are characterized by a neglect of the public sector, 
broad and supply-driven innovation schemes, and an explicit promotion of export-led growth. 
This partial type of government intervention not only has shifted pharmaceutical innovation 
efforts from the public sphere to the private sector, but it has also linked it to the global mar-
ket. Today, export-oriented private firms account for two thirds of total R&D expenditure and 
have become the undisputed center of the Indian PIS (Chaturvedy/Chataway 2006; Mani 2006: 
27f ).
Government intervention in Brazil differs considerably. The already mentioned “active state” 
directs all innovation activities toward sustaining the SUS. In this spirit, innovation is not 
primarily seen as a bridge to global integration but, on the contrary, as a means to become less 
vulnerable to global economic cycles and as a means to solve social problems (Interview 227; 
245; 253; 255). In order to guarantee sustainability in national health care, the Brazilian state 
adopts a “tight political management” (Doctor 2009: 14) and puts itself at the center of the PIS. 
Again, three features of government intervention are noticeable in this regard.
First and in contrast to India, state activity in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector was not cut 
back after TRIPs. Indeed, the opposite is true. When state-owned laboratories were suffering 
from rising competition and inefficiencies in the late 1990s, Brazil’s National Health Congress 
decided against privatization and reaffirmed the role of government companies in supplying 
medicines to the national health system (Flynn 2008: 517). Since then, the expansion of public 
production and innovation capabilities depicts one central pillar in the government’s effort to 
guaranteeing sustainable and affordable health products (Chamas 2005: 83f ). Unlike Indian 
7 Significantly, while these standards assure a high quality for exports, regulatory marketing appro-
vals sought for the Indian market suffer from corruption and lax enforcement (Reddy 2012).
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authorities, the Brazilian government has effectively and aggressively enacted its CL system 
as a means of guaranteeing access to treatment and enhancing national industrial production 
capabilities for greater autonomy from multinationals (Cassier/Correa 2007: 84).8 Although 
Brazilian authorities recognize CL as a last resort instrument, they leave no doubt that they 
would enact it again if domestic health care came into risk (Interview 227; 246; 253; 255).
Second, in Brazil, government intervention is not limited to the furnishing of the private 
sector but includes its replacement. Brazil has a total of eighteen public pharmaceutical labo-
ratories. One of these, Far-Manguinhos, is directly subordinated to the federal government’s 
Ministry of Health (Flynn 2008: 515). Unlike CSIR and ICMR, Far-Manguinhos encompasses 
research and manufacturing capabilities and can hence formulate without private sector par-
ticipation. The public laboratories function as main supplier for the Ministry of Health’s pro-
curement policy and strictly follow the demand of the SUS (Rezaie et al. 2008: 627). To ensure 
the supplies of SUS relevant technology, Brazil’s Ministry of Health has established a complex 
of industry and innovation for health (Complexo industrial da Saúde or CIS) that fosters public-
private partnerships for the development and production of pharmaceuticals needed for the 
SUS. The program is a direct reaction to the increased vulnerability of the SUS through TRIPs 
and places a strong emphasis on politically monitored technology transfer and on domestic 
technological development where private partners generally supply the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (APIs) while public laboratories formulate the drug. The end product, again, is 
exclusively delivered to the Ministry of Health (Interview 226; 245). So far, the majority of the 
API suppliers are domestic companies. However, multinationals are also incorporated provi-
ded that they are disposed to transfer technology to domestic laboratories. As an official in the 
Ministry of Health states: “It is not about a cut between the national and the international, but 
about an utmost security for the SUS” (Interview 227).
Third, government funding and fiscal reliefs for in-house R&D are earmarked and closely 
monitored (De Brito/De Mello 2006: 19ff). Research funds are managed by public agencies – 
most prominently by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and the Financing Agency for 
Studies and Projects (FINEP), who work on a tendering basis. Their distributions are bound to 
certain conditions that largely hamper the export orientation of private firms. FINEP funds 
have to be spent inside Brazil exclusively, even if the required capabilities are not available in 
the country. If a firm intends to license a technology where public funds have been used, it 
must obtain permission from FINEP (Rezaie et al. 2008: 634). Similar rules apply to the public 
laboratories (Interview 226; 236). In addition to this, money is distributed on a topical basis. 
The Health Sector Fund, created in 2001 to encourage the increase of private investment in 
R&D, provides money exclusively for health research in areas that are of interest to the SUS 
(Chamas 2005: 101; Doctor 2009: 13f ). Equally, in the case of the Technology Fund (Funtec), 
8 Brazil has used the threat of issuing a CL as a bargaining chip several times. Between 2001 and 2005, 
Brazil reached price discounts with Merck, Roche, Abbott, and Gilead of up to 65% for Antiretrovi-
rals (ARVs) and anti-cancer drugs in return for not issuing CLs. What caused the most stir was the 
discussion about Merck’s ARV drug Efavirenz, which was declared as being “public interest” by the 
Ministry of Health in 2007. After talks over price reductions failed, Brazil kept its threat and issued 
a compulsory license for Efavirenz in May 2007 (Love 2007: 14ff).
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which declares drug development a key objective, research activities have to be “in confor-
mity with the strategic interests of the country as well as the federal public programs and 
policies”9 in order to be entitled to receive funding. The schemes restrict government support 
to research that is considered relevant for domestic health. What comes out of this is a chain 
of (domestic and foreign) private and public sector health product developers and manufactu-
rers that, held together by the government’s overall “promise of markets,” orients its actions 
almost exclusively to the health needs of the Brazilian domestic market (Cassier/Correa 2007: 
85; Interview 227). 
6. Learning shapes: Technical steeling vs. social compatibility
In the previous two sections, I have argued that different state roles and types of government 
intervention have promoted global integration in India and a continuing domestic orientation 
in Brazil. In this section, I suggest that state roles and government interventions spur diffe-
rent learning strategies that, in turn, consolidate the varying PIS orientations. Learning takes 
place both through interaction and formal education (Lundvall 2007: 107; Parto et al. 2006). 
First, due to the relatively weak domestic demand in India and strong competitive structures, 
private firms successively entered into cooperation with foreign actors. Left without any major 
government protection, they are trying to use their cost advantage to access large Northern 
markets. Strong compliance with global standards and elaborate in-house R&D capabilities, 
both of which have been encouraged by public policies, make them a preferred global destina-
tion for contract research and licensing agreements with foreign multinationals (Chaturvedy/
Chataway 2006: 15f; Chaudhuri 2008: 269; Neeraj 2011: 2). Maintaining ever more links with 
global players, Indian firms and institutes are creating a high profile for outsourcing R&D and 
manufacturing for the global market. And as developed country markets are more lucrative 
than the Indian market, Indian companies have an incentive to enhance their knowledge base 
in fields that are needed abroad rather than to respond to the domestic market. A former chief 
official at CSIR states that, “Indian companies work more and more in direction of multina-
tional companies” (Interview 322). Today, they are hardly involved in drug development in the 
field of neglected diseases and local production and research efforts are becoming increasin-
gly detached from domestic health care needs (Abrol 2006: 26; Chaudhuri 2008: 269ff). 
For Brazilian private firms, in contrast, international links play practically no role (Interview 
227; 235). Entrepreneurial cooperation with foreign entities is mostly restricted to marketing 
or service provision relationships. Foreign R&D partnerships that could impact the learning 
within the PIS take place very rarely.10 This is not surprising considering the relatively low 
9 http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Areas_de_Atuacao/Inovacao/Funtec/, last viewed 
on 10/26/2011. 
10 The very few co-development of R&D efforts with foreign entities in Brazil are generally done tog-
ether with universities or public entities. One exception is Eurofarma, which formed a joint venture 
with the Portuguese firm Edol Laboratory (Rezaie et al. 2008: 634).
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degree of both international conformity in terms of production standards and R&D capabi-
lities in most Brazilian private firms, which make them far less attractive for multinationals 
than their Indian counterparts (Paranhos 2010). Apart from this, it doesn’t seem attractive for 
Brazilian firms to enter into international partnerships outside the governmental framework 
as this would restrain both access to funds and market sales. Against this backdrop, the most 
rational way for Brazilian firms to allocate their resources is to focus on the demand of the na-
tional health system as formulated by the government thereby consolidating their knowledge 
base in domestically relevant areas.
Second, human resource development shapes actors’ orientations. Formal education and trai-
ning are crucial sources for the orientation of future personnel within the PIS. India and Bra-
zil are adopting different approaches in this regard. In Brazil, emphasis has been placed on 
human resources development in health innovation that keeps with the priorities of the SUS. 
Brazil is one of the few countries that sustain decided governance instruments in the field of 
health science. The government has established a specific learning strategy for the education, 
training, and incorporation of human resources as part of its PIS. A key principle within this 
system is that research priorities should be defined domestically and not by external entities 
(Alger et al. 2009: 7f; Chamas 2005: 89). Brazil’s PIS comprises of a network of universities, na-
tional schools, and research institutes that encourages scientific and technological production 
in health research. Formal education of health personnel is basically accomplished within 
the country. In addition to the regular pharmaceutical formation system, a broad range of 
public health degrees can be completed throughout the country. The government also provi-
des support for post-graduates in the fields of health science. In addition to this, the Ministry 
of Health maintains a National School for Public Health (Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública 
or ENSP) which has the stated objective to train and form human resources for the SUS and 
which has one of the largest and best equipped faculties within the country.11 More than one 
quarter of the active research groups in Brazil are linked to the field of public health, inclu-
ding more than 18,000 researchers. And government authorities endeavor to further match 
their research priorities with the emphases of its public health priorities, e.g., by giving out 
awards for outstanding scientific achievement for the SUS (Chamas 2005: 89f, 104). 
By improving its formation system, the Indian state in contrast has placed its emphasis on 
technology management and the establishment of business schools, thereby hoping to build 
on global competitiveness (Wright 2008: 10f ). There has been a steady rise in education in 
pharmaceutical innovation during the last few years with an extension of courses and tea-
ching capacities. Currently, pharmaceutical teaching takes place at 500 colleges encompassing 
around 61,000 places for students. The Indian pharmaceutical education is inspired by the US 
system and meets international standards. It is comprised of a professional pharmacy docto-
ral program, which lasts six years, including one year of practical study, and five additional 
years for a PhD (Neeraj 2011: 5).12 However, unlike in Brazil, pharmaceutical education is not 
11 http://www.ensp.fiocruz.br/portal-ensp/apresentacao/, last viewed on 12/17/2011.
12 http://www.pharmainfo.net/abhi271183/pharmd-program-india, last viewed on 06/25/2012.
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linked to national health policies. Education in this field is lead by the Pharmacy Council of 
India (PCI), a statutory body under the Ministry of Health, and the All India Council of Tech-
nical Education (AICTE), which is linked to the Ministry of Human Resource Development. 
Both institutions pursue a strongly technical and market-oriented approach in fulfilling their 
mandate (Interview 295; Interview 324). The PCI focuses on the need for “clinically and tech-
nologically trained pharmacy professionals who can face global challenges and compete with 
the multinationals.”13 At the PCI-organized National Seminar on Recent Trends in Pharmacy 
Education and Practice in 2010, a clear emphasis was put on technical skills. Of the 21 scien-
tific programs, only one addressed public health – and significantly it was global not national 
health issues (PCI 2010). In the same vein, the AICTE highlights “technological development 
and economic progress” without pointing to aspects of health care.14
7. India and Brazil: On the road to different SSIP? 
The previous sections have revealed that PIS in India and Brazil differ considerably in terms of 
demand, linkages, and learning. In all three cases, the state plays a decisive role. Motivated by 
the aim to guarantee sustainable and affordable health products, Brazil has articulated a PIS 
in which demand, linkages, and learning remain focused on the domestic market in order to 
sustain the SUS. India, in contrast, neglects the integration of innovation forces with domestic 
health care and instead orients its innovation capabilities to export-led growth. This approach 
is expressed in a globalized demand structure, strong linkages with foreign market actors, 
and a technical- as well as global-oriented learning system (table 3).
Table 3 – Post-TRIPs NSI characteristics in the Indian and Brazilian PIS
Brazil India
Demand Predominantly domestic
Concentrated in public sector
To large extent international
Concentrated in private sector
Linkages Oriented toward the government and 
the national health system
Oriented toward the foreign market 
and global partnerships
Learning Oriented toward technical skills and 
public health
Oriented toward technical skills and 
global standards
The differences presented in this paper between India and Brazil point to two distinct social 
systems of innovation and production (SSIP) as introduced in the first section of this paper. 
The Brazilian case meets the specifications of the social democratic and public SSIP. In this 
model, the solution of social problems takes priority over the enforcement of intellectual pro-
perty rights and radical innovation. The state takes an active stance in the conciliation bet-
13 http://www.pci.nic.in/, last viewed on 10/28/2011.
14 http://www.aicte-india.org/aboutus.htm, last viewed on 10/28/2011.
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ween public interests, aligning innovation efforts with public health objectives. Government 
interventions are extensive and coherently directed to the national health system. Activities 
include encouragement as well as the replacement of the private sector. The public sector is 
the undisputed leader in innovative and manufacturing processes while private sector firms 
link their resources to public infrastructure and social demand. The Brazilian approach re-
sults in a strong representation of local resource-based activities and a pressure to adopt new 
techniques linked to societal health needs.
The Indian case, by contrast, fits into the model of the market-based and meso-corporatist 
SSIP. Driven by strongly competitive structures, the pharmaceutical sector operates “in the 
strict framework of market incentives” (Cassier/Correa 2007: 84). Government interventions 
are restricted to furnishing and complementing the private sector. They act as booster for eco-
nomic development and global integration, linking private firms to the global market. Large 
amounts of in-house R&D and a pronounced IP regime are the important drivers for “catching 
up” and product innovations. The Indian model results in strong innovation capabilities and 
a structural underinvestment in collective goods (table 4). 
Table 4 – Social Systems of Innovation and Production (SSIP) in India and Brazil
Brazil India
SSIP Social-democratic/public Market-based/meso-corporatist
General prin-
ciple
Conciliation between public interests un-
der state control
Market-based competition
Development 
priority
Solution of social problems Economic development and global 
integration
Government 
intervention
Extensive and coherent
Encouragement and replacement of 
private sector
Declining and fragmented 
Furnishing and complementing the 
private sector
Underinvestment in collective goods
IP regime Subordinated to health in case of 
doubt
Key incentive for innovation
Innovation Gradual evolution toward advanced 
technologies 
Public research disconnected from new 
products development
Adaptation in “catching-up phase” and 
product innovation after
Importance of in-house research
Importance of niche products and 
radical innovations 
Industrial 
specification
Linked to public infrastructure and so-
cial demand
Linked to global market
Source: Own compilation; based on Amable (2000: 671ff).
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8. Conclusion
Departing from the observation that TRIPs is impacting emerging countries’ innovation sys-
tems, this paper has analyzed the post-TRIPs pharmaceutical innovation developments in 
India and Brazil. The empirical findings reveal major differences in the regulatory outcomes 
that go far beyond the (non-)adoption of certain legal flexibilities that have been put at the cen-
ter of analysis by scholars so far. While India has oriented its PIS strongly toward export-led 
growth, the Brazilian PIS functions almost exclusively for the satisfaction of domestic demand 
as determined by its national health system. As the case of compulsory licensing reveals, dis-
tinct implementation of certain flexibilities can be assessed more appropriately if interpreted 
against the backdrop of the overall innovation system. The Indian government denies actively 
supporting the enactment of CL in order to not deter economic growth and global integration. 
The Brazilian authorities, in contrast, take a robust stance against multinational companies 
in order to ensure the sustainability of their health program. The differences are rooted in 
varying development priorities that, in turn, point to different social systems of innovation 
and production. Brazil has developed a social-democratic and public SSIP, whereas in India, 
characteristics of a market-based and meso-corporatist SSIP prevail. 
The analytical classification of the varying regulatory outcomes adds to comparative analy-
sis of NSI. This study confirms that the NSI framework is not restricted to OECD countries. 
Rather, its assumptions can be transferred to emerging countries like India and Brazil. The 
findings discussed here also indicate that emerging countries can choose between different 
trajectories when adapting their innovation systems. However, this recognition is quite recent 
and much more research is required with special attention to the underlying conditions in 
these adaptation processes. This paper, therefore, presents a first step within a larger research 
context in which I aim to investigate the ways in which TRIPs impact national innovation 
systems of developing countries. This paper already suggests that the emerging countries’ 
adaptation efforts are taking place under the pressure of globalization. The NSI concept must 
therefore be expanded to include the international dimensions of innovation systems and to 
properly assess linkages between national and international innovation systems.
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